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Abstract—The Internet has been weaponized to carry out
cybercriminal activities at an unprecedented pace. The rising
concerns for preserving the privacy of personal data while
availing modern tools and technologies is alarming. End-to-end
encrypted solutions are in demand for almost all commercial
platforms. On one side, it seems imperative to provide such
solutions and give people trust to reliably use these platforms.
On the other side, this creates a huge opportunity to carry
out unchecked cybercrimes. This paper proposes a robust video
hashing technique, scalable and efficient in chalking out matches
from an enormous bulk of videos floating on these commercial
platforms. The video hash is validated to be robust to common
manipulations like scaling, corruptions by noise, compression,
and contrast changes that are most probable to happen during
transmission. It can also be transformed into the encrypted
domain and work on top of encrypted videos without deciphering.
Thus, it can serve as a potential forensic tool that can trace the
illegal sharing of videos without knowing the underlying content.
Hence, it can help preserve privacy and combat cybercrimes such
as revenge porn, hateful content, child abuse, or illegal material
propagated in a video.
I. INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented growth in the rate of multimedia capture
and transmission technologies is witnessing a massive explo-
sion of data worldwide. According to recent statistics in 2017,
every minute of YouTube upload accounts to nearly 300 hours
of video upload. The average number of visitors browsing
YouTube everyday accounts to nearly 30 million. Facebook,
the biggest social media site, has a daily average of 8 billion
video views from around 500 million users.
Given the massive growth of online videos, retrieval of
efficient videos is a challenging task. The design of a fast and
efficient content-based search for videos is very challenging
compared to images. A video has a complex, diverse pattern of
high-level information across the frames like action recogni-
tion, event detection, etc. apart from the low-level information
contained within the frames [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. Even a small
snippet of a video needs massive computational resources to
extract a signature that can be used for mapping across the
vast repository of the available videos. The development of an
efficient framework that can facilitate fast retrieval of relevant
videos for a given query video is a challenging research
problem.
Videos are more susceptible to security and privacy breaches
as they carry both absolute and contextual information. They
may lead to serious consequences if the video carries any
confidential information. Upcoming news about privacy losses
has already alarmed society. Hence, end-to-end encryption
based solutions are in high demand. Maintaining the utility
of the solutions and addressing security and privacy concerns
is a challenging research area.
Homomorphic encryption is a class of encryption schemes
that allows operations on the encrypted content but is compu-
tationally quite expensive. Catering the problem of the videos
with this homomorphic encryption tool becomes even more
challenging. With so much bulk content in a video, the hash
extraction must be designed very strategically to be feasibly
used in real-time scenarios.
In this paper, we describe a secure video hashing algo-
rithm that extracts a unique signature from the encrypted
videos exploiting the homomorphic properties of the Pallier
cryptosystem. The signature is robust against common manip-
ulations like compression quality, additive noise, re-scaling,
and non-linear intensity adjustments (gamma correction). The
algorithm is designed based on the restricted homomorphic
operations, i.e., addition and scalar multiplication, so that
the same signature can be extracted from its corresponding
unencrypted (plaintext) version. Large-scale experiments are
performed to validate the efficacy of the algorithm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the related
research on video hashing is summarized in Section II. Section
III discusses in brief the homomorphic properties of Paillier
cryptosystem, Section IV discusses the proposed video hashing
and then its transformation in the encrypted domain is dis-
cussed in Section V. The validation of the proposed algorithm
is briefed in Section VI, followed by discussion in Section
VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Videos contribute a significant proportion to the deluge of
data shared every day on social media sites. Though substantial
contribution has been made to content-based image retrieval
methods in the literature, video hashing is still very limited.
This is largely contributed to the complex nature of the video
contents. The broad spectrum of information ranges from
low-level features contained in the individual frames to high-
level semantic-based information. There can be diversified
dynamic backgrounds and complex cues of people’s activities.
It becomes incredibly challenging to perform a similarity-
based search given the enormous video corpus on the Web.
Traditional video hashing schemes mainly aimed to address
two major categories of problems: near-duplicate retrieval and
content-based video retrieval (CBVR). For the former class,
conventional hashing techniques were employed for efficient
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identification of duplicate videos [6], [7], [8]. For the second
class, most semantically similar videos were searched for a
given query video [9], [10], [11], [5].
CBVR schemes can be further divided into three sub-
categories: Schemes that extract the video information in the
form of a representative feature vector and then design efficient
hashing functions to work on top of it. The second class
extends the image hashing algorithm to videos by treating
each frame of video as an image and computes a similarity
score by averaging the individual frame-to-frame distance
metrics. However, this straightforward application is quite
computationally expensive, as even a small snippet of a video
has more than fifty frames considering an average frame rate
of 20 fps. The third category of schemes first selects some
frames as representative of video information and then applies
the image hashing algorithm to these frames to extract a
hash value. This is quite challenging as a trade-off needs
to be maintained between retaining the necessary informing
and throwing away any repeated information to keep up the
time efficiency of the hash. Even these schemes are unable to
exploit the temporal information of the videos.
Song et al. [8] employed multiple feature extraction methods
that exploited the local structures of the frames to obtain the
binary codes. Douze et al. [7] used the traditional hashing
algorithms to extract the binary codes. Cao et al. [9] extracted
a few representative frames and used a sub-modular hashing
framework to derive a hash value that was used for video
search. However, no statistical heuristics were used in this
scheme to arrive at the video hash. A linear hash function
which exploited the temporal information of the videos via
employing the supervised structural learning was proposed by
Ye et al. [11]. A video retrieval scheme exploiting the kernel
max-margin spanning through the Euclidean space and the
Riemannian manifold was proposed by Li et al. [12], [10].
Though they represented features through a covariance matrix,
the Spatio-temporal information remains to be exploited.
Hence, it is desirable to present a video hashing framework
that learns strong features by utilizing the temporal infor-
mation, and in turn, also minimizes the hamming distance
computation. The design of an efficient distance metric to
retrieve the most relevant videos based on a query video is
a very challenging problem. Unlike searches based on textual
titles that are easier to implement employing an inverted index
structure, proposing a similarity metric for videos is challenged
by the difficulty of modeling the video semantics.
Here, we present a robust video hashing algorithm that is
computationally very efficient and relies only on addition and
scalar multiplication to extract a compact, distinct, and robust
signature based on the global features on the content. This
simplicity of computation enables the signature computation
and comparison equivalently on the encrypted content. Though
simple, it is still robust to common image manipulations that
are most likely to happen during the sharing of videos over
social media. Another advantage of the proposed scheme is
that the hash extracted from encrypted content is in plain-
text domain. It can be directly compared for a match with
the database content signatures, whether they may be kept
encrypted or unencrypted. For the entire protocol, the server
requires only one round of pre-interaction with the client at
the very start where some encrypted metadata needs to be sent
by the client apart from the encrypted content. For a false
positive rate of 1 in 10 million, the proposed scheme’s true
positive rate remains high at 93.5%. We envision deploying
this technology can tackle the problem of revenge porn as it
resolves the people’s primary concern in the solution proposed
by Facebook, where they have to compromise with their
privacy to avail of the possible solution.
III. PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEM
The Paillier cryptosystem is a partially homomorphic
and asymmetric encryption scheme [13]. The
encryption/decryption is done using a public-private key
pair.
A plaintext message m can be encrypted to ciphertext c as
follows:
c = E(m, r; g, n) = mod(gm × rn, n2), (1)
where r is a random integer satisfying 0 < r < n. Incor-
porating this random value ensures that the same plaintext is
encoded as different ciphertexts under the same public key.
The public key (n, g) is generated using two large prime
numbers p and q as follows:
n = p× q (2)
g = n+ 1 (3)
A ciphertext message c is decrypted as follows:
D(c;λ, µ, n) = mod
(
mod(cλ, n2)− 1
n
× µ, n
)
. (4)
The private key (λ, µ) is computed as:
λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1) (5)
µ = mod(α, n), (6)
where lcm(·) denotes the least common multiple operator,
mod(·) is the modulo operator, and the extended Euclidean
algorithm computes α. Specifically, γ is first computed as
follows:
γ = gcd
(
mod(gλ, n2)− 1
n
, n
)
, (7)
where gcd(·) is the greatest common divisor operator. The
Be´zout coefficients α and β satisfy:
γ = α× mod(g
λ, n2)− 1
n
+ β × n (8)
The homomorphic properties satisfied by the Paillier cryp-
tosystem are addition and scalar multiplication.
• The sum of two plaintexts messages m1 and m2 is equal
to the decrypted product of two ciphertexts c1 and c2
under the appropriate modular arithmetic:
mod(m1 +m2, n) = D(mod(c1 × c2, n2);λ, µ, n) (9)
• The product of a scalar s and a plaintext m1 is equal
to the decrypted exponentiation of ciphertext by a scalar
value under the appropriate modular arithmetic:
mod(s×m1, n) = D(mod(cs1, n2);λ, µ, n) (10)
We will describe a robust video hashing scheme (extraction
and comparison) that requires only addition and scalar multi-
plication in the plaintext domain and can be fully transformed
in the encrypted domain.
IV. ROBUST VIDEO HASHING
A brute-force approach to video hashing is to simply hash
every individual frame and concatenate the frame hashes
into one long hash for comparison against a reference hash.
Although attractive for its simplicity, this approach is not
particularly desirable. In particular, the resulting hash will
be prohibitively large: At a standard 30 frames/second, and
even modest three-minute video will yield 5, 400 individual
hashes, each of some fixed length based on the hashing
algorithm. Such a large hash will lead to significant compu-
tational and bandwidth demands. Given the highly redundant
nature of most videos, this simple but inefficient approach
is unnecessary. In the proposed method, we adopt selectively
hashing a particular set of video frames contrary to hashing
every video frame. Only those video frames that provide
new identifiable information not previously seen in the video
stream are incorporated to contribute to the video hash. The
basic framework of the video hashing is depicted in Fig.1.
It has four main phases: the selection of content frames,
pre-processing of frames, computation of video hash, and
comparison of video hashes. Each phase of the video hashing
pipeline consists of tightly coupled sub-phases that altogether
achieve a specific objective and facilitates the execution of the
next phase. The details are as follows:
A. Selection of Content Frames
A video hash must be a compact and distinct signature that
can uniquely identify a video amongst billions and trillions
of videos floating on the internet. This phase eliminates the
redundant information in a video by dropping the blank frames
or similar information content frames because that leads to an
unnecessary increase in length without fetching the advantage
of added information. As video length increases, the cost of
processing and storing a video hash increases at a tremendous
rate. This phase has blank frame removal, and keyframe
extraction as its two sub-phases.
1) Blank Frame Removal: In a video, the frames that do not
have much information or content variation can be considered
blank frames. Mostly, these frames represent homogeneous
surfaces like walls, blackboards, or natural scenic stretch like
frames contributing to sky appearance, water bodies, etc.
Removal of such frames will incur no information loss of a
video and facilitate the next keyframe extraction phase.
2) Key Frame Extraction: Keyframes need to be extracted
from a bucket of content frames after the removal of the blank
frames. Even at a standard rate of 30 frames/second, much
redundant information is captured to give a sense of smooth
motion to the human eyes. This increment of information
is directly proportional to the increase in the frame rate.
In key frame extraction, a consecutive frame is considered
as a keyframe only if there is a significant addition to the
information recorded for the previous keyframe. Any standard
distance metric can be employed for the frame hashes to
extract the keyframes. If the distance exceeds a threshold
value, then the successive frame is kept as keyframe else
discarded. At this point, some supplementary information like
the number of frames dropped in between two keyframes,
indices of keyframes, percentage of keyframes as a function
of the total number of content frames, etc. can be recorded.
This process is done for the entire video.
B. Pre-processing of Frames
To further enhance the computational complexity of a video
hash, some pre-processing to the extracted keyframes can be
performed. The basic pre-processing includes converting the
frames to gray-scale, fixing a resolution for the frames, and
histogram equalization of the fixed-size frames. Instead of
processing individual color channels, it is faster to process
the gray-scale version of a frame. Resizing to a fixed resolu-
tion (practically feasible to process) enhances the processing
speed. Histogram equalization can take care of the varying
illumination conditions in which the video was shot. So, the
video similarity score doesn’t get affected by this factor and is
mainly focused on capturing the information about the content.
C. Computation of Video Hash
Once the keyframes are extracted and pre-processed, a
standard image hashing algorithm can be employed to extract
the hash of these frames. The hashes of the frames are
concatenated in a temporal order to obtain the final video
hash. The length of a video hash is a variable quantity and
depends on many factors like the length of the video snippet,
the number of keyframes, the presence of blank frames in the
original video, etc.
D. Comparison of video hashes
Unlike image hashes that are guaranteed to be the same
length, video hashes can be of arbitrary length. As a result, two
video hashes of different lengths can not be compared using
the traditional distance measures like L1-norm, Euclidean
distance, Minkowski distance, etc. as used to compare image
hashes. Variable-length hashes are a bit of a nuisance, but also
create an opportunity.
We utilize the longest common substring (LCS) (not to be
confused with the longest common sub-sequence algorithm)
[14] to measure the similarity of two variable-length video
hashes. By way of intuition, the LCS of the two strings
Fig. 1. Overview of Video Hashing
“ABABACABBC” and “ABACABACBBCA” is six because
the longest common string shared by these strings is “ABA-
CAB.” Note that these strings also have the substring “BBC”
in common, but this is shorter than the substring of length
six. Given two strings of length m and n, the LCS can be
found efficiently using dynamic programming with a run-
time complexity of O(mn). The advantage of using LCS
to compare two hashes is that it allows us to find not just
matching videos but also video segments that are extracted or
video segments that are embedded within a larger video (e.g., a
video compilation). Within this LCS computation, two hashes,
corresponding to a single keyframe, are of course, of the same
length as the image hash algorithm used for its computation.
However, LCS alone was not able to capture the similarity of
two matching videos.
To take care of the situation, we incorporated two factors to
determine when to increase the LCS count for two matching
videos. First is, of course, the hash values for the correspond-
ing keyframes of the two videos must match. This could be
measured using any standard distance metric. We adopted the
L1-norm to compute the difference of the hash values for
the corresponding frames for simplicity. It must fall below
a threshold to indicate a considerable similarity of the frames.
The second most important factor that we incorporated was
considering the number of video frames dropped in between
the consecutive keyframes. For two videos to be similar, the
temporal information needs to be matched on this basis. If
the difference between the number of dropped frames of the
corresponding keyframes falls below a threshold value, then
only it signifies the temporal similarity. So, whenever both
the aforementioned conditions are satisfied, the LCS count
is incremented. The increment is done by the average of
the dropped frames for the corresponding keyframes. This is
repeated for matching the entire video sequence. The final
similarity score for the videos is this LCS value.
V. TRANSFORMATION IN THE ENCRYPTED DOMAIN
The threat to privacy is a significant concern for almost
all applications. It has fueled the research in the encrypted
domain. We look for video hash that can be transformed in the
encrypted domain. It is possible only when the computations
are based on properties supported by homomorphic encryption
schemes. In the proposed video hash framework, this is very
much achievable as the image hash algorithm used is the robust
homomorphic image hashing algorithm proposed in [15]. The
computations involved in the hash extraction are limited to
addition and scalar multiplication. These computations are
supported by Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme.
To enable the video hash in the encrypted domain, the two
phases: the selection of content frames and pre-processing
of frames must be done is a trusted zone like the ARM
TrustZone. The TrustZone provides a secure environment by
providing a secure operating system, secure storage, and a
secure set of applications. The processor core in the TrustZone
is divided into two virtual cores referred to as worlds: normal
world and secure world. Access to the secure world is highly
regulated. Hence, sensitive applications can operate in this
secure environment. Non-secure applications can be executed
in the normal world. Both the secure world and the normal
world are separated by hardware extensions.
At the end of the second phase, the pre-processed frames
can be encrypted using the homomorphic Paillier encryption.
Once the frames are encrypted, the last two phases of the
video hash algorithm can work outside the TrustZone. In
phase 3, the video hash is obtained via the concatenation of
frame hashes in temporal order. As the hash of the encrypted
frames is extracted using the image hash algorithm proposed
in [15], the hash is in plaintext domain. The video hash is the
concatenation of these plaintext hashes, and hence, it will also
be in plaintext domain.
Phase 4 of the video hash framework where comparison of
video hashes is made, will work on top of these plaintext video
hashes. The supplementary information of a video needed for
computation of similarity score comprises of the count of the
dropped frames in between the keyframes. This information
can be provided in the plaintext domain itself as no substantial
leakage of information about the original video sequence can
take place from this particular information. Hence, video hash
computation is feasible in the encrypted domain. This provides
much potential for addressing issues of privacy-preserving
applications and combating illegal activities happening on the
encrypted channels.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION AND ROBUSTNESS
We constructed a dataset of approximately 12000 videos
ranging in length from 2 to 6 seconds. Using the plaintext
video hashing described above, we hashed all of these videos
and computed a pairwise comparison of all videos to remove
any duplicates. Any video pairs with an LCS below a specified
threshold were manually reviewed to determine if they were
duplicates. One of the pairs of any confirmed duplicates was
removed from our dataset, yielding a final video count of
11, 278.
In order to determine the robustness of our video hash to
common image manipulations, we generated 5500 variations
of each video with varying and random amounts of gamma
correction Iγ(x, y) with γ ∈ [0.5, 2], additive Gaussian noise
with SNR in the range [15, 60] (dB), MPEG compression with
quality in the range [2, 23]. The quality ranges from 0 to 51,
where 0 is lossless, 23 is the default, and 51 is the worst
quality possible. Scaling is done in the range [0.25, 1].
These manipulations were applied to the video prior to the
pre-processing stage. We computed the LCS distance between
the original video and each of its variants, yielding a total of
over 62 million (“similar”) comparisons. We also computed
the LCS distance between the hash of each of the original
videos and the remaining 11278 − 1 videos, yielding a total
of over 63 million (“different”) comparisons.
A robust video hash should have relatively large “similar”
distances and small “different” distances. The receiver operat-
ing characteristic (ROC) curve in Fig. 2 reports the accuracy
of correctly classifying “similar” (solid-blue) and “different”
Fig. 2. Accuracy of classifying similar (solid-blue) and different (dashed-red)
videos as a function of the threshold on the longest common substring (LCS)
between two hashes. The cross-over point is 97.5%. See also Figure 3.
(dashed-red) videos as a function of the LCS threshold. The
cross-over point of these curves is at 97.5% accuracy. With
a false positive rate (incorrectly identifying different videos
as the same) of 0.01%, and 0.001%, the true positive rate
(correctly identifying similar videos as similar) is 97.5%, and
95.5%. At a false positive rate of 1 in 10 million, the true
positive rate remains relatively high at 88.4%.
Shown in Fig. 3, from top to bottom, is the true positive rate
(with a fixed false-positive rate of 0.001%) as a function of the
amount of gamma correction, additive noise, MPEG quality,
and scaling. Each data point in each panel corresponded to
all videos with the specified distortion and integrated across
all other distortions. From top to bottom, we see that: (1) the
sensitivity to gamma correction is asymmetric with slightly
lower robustness to gamma values greater than 1.0; (2) the
hash is robust to SNR larger than 25 dB; and (3) the hash is
robust to a range of compression qualities and scalings.
A. Efficiency
The experiments were conducted on a machine running ma-
cOS with an Intel Core i5, 2.3 GHz. MatLab was used for the
implementation of plaintext video hash, whereas the ciphertext
version was done in Java. The video length and pre-processing
steps do affect the run-time efficiency of the algorithm. For our
dataset of 12K videos of duration ranging from 2 seconds to 6
seconds, the average run-time for extraction of plaintext video
hash was 0.05 seconds and 15.3 seconds for the ciphertext
version.
VII. DISCUSSION
Privacy-preserving solutions that can help secure the privacy
of outsourced data floating on social media sites but still help
combat propagation of illegal content is the need of the hour.
This balance can be achieved by exploiting the encryption
schemes’ homomorphic properties and focusing on the design
of efficient algorithms based on the simple computations. We
proposed a video hash algorithm in this paper and discussed
for possible transformation in the ciphertext domain. In the
Fig. 3. Accuracy of classifying similar videos as a function of gamma
correction, additive noise, MPEG quality, and scaling, for a fixed false alarm
rate of 0.001%.
future, an integrated solution incorporating the other modali-
ties like text and audio can be coupled together with images
and videos to give a complete solution.
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